




















Quantum List Decoding from Quantumly Corrupted Codewords for
Classical Block Codes of Polynomially Small Rate
Tomoyuki Yamakami
Abstract
Our task of quantum list decoding for a classical
block code is to recover from a given quantumly cor-
rupted codeword a short list containing all messages
whose codewords have high “presence” in this quan-
tumly corrupted codeword. All known families of ef-
ficiently quantum list decodable codes, nonetheless,
have exponentially-small message rate. We show that
certain generalized Reed-Solomon codes concatenated
with Hadamard codes of polynomially-small rate and
constant codeword alphabet size have efficient quan-
tum list decoding algorithms, provided that target
codewords should have relatively high presence in a
given quantumly corrupted codeword.
Keywords: error-correcting code, quantum list de-
coding, quantum computation, quantumly corrupted
codeword
1 Introduction
Classical list decoding, which was rooted in the late
1950s by Elias [3] and Wozencraft [18], has drawn
significant attention since Sudan’s [15] discovery of
an efficient list decoding algorithm for Reed-Solomon
codes beyond its “traditional” error-correction radius.
List decoding has since then found useful applications
to cryptography as well as complexity theory (see,
e.g., a survey article [16]).
Quantum list decoding dealing with classical block
codes first arose in connection to quantum hardcore
functions in a seminal paper by Kawachi and Ya-
makami [12] (following an early result of Adcock and
Cleve [1] on biased oracles) in the so-called implicit-
input explicit-output model, in which we wish to out-
put a list of messages with oracle access to a quan-
tum encoding procedure which produces a quantum
superposition of corrupted codewords. This model
differs from the conventional error-correction model
between a sender and a receiver through a noisy chan-
nel. In contrast, we are given a (possibly) faulty quan-
tum algorithm (known as a quantum-computationally
corrupted codeword or quantumly corrupted codeword)
which encodes a classical message to a certain quan-
tum state representing a quantum corruption of the
correct codeword. It is in general hard to recover the
original message from such a quantumly corrupted
codeword; however, we may be able to produce a rea-
sonably small list that contains all messages whose
codewords are close proximity to the given quantumly
corrupted codeword. This closeness is scaled by the
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notion of presence, which expresses the average prob-
ability of obtaining each block of the target codeword
from the quantumly corrupted codeword. (See [12]
for an intuition behind this notion.) This is the pri-
mary purpose of quantum list decoding. A natural
question is: what types of classical block codes are
efficiently quantum list decodable?
There are known families of block codes that are
efficiently quantum list decodable with arbitrary pres-
ence. The first known example is Hadamard codes. In
classical list decoding, Goldreich and Levin [5] showed
the classical list decodability of the binary Hadamard
codes and subsequently Goldreich, Rubinfeld, and Su-
dan [6] gave a general list decoding algorithm for the
q-ary Hadamard codes. Concerning quantum list de-
coding, Adcock and Cleve [1] essentially proved that
the binary Hadamard codes are quantum list decod-
able in polynomial time. For the q-ary Hadamard
codes, a fast quantum list decoding algorithm was re-
cently given by Kawachi and Yamakami [12]. They
also presented two additional quantum list decod-
able codes: shifted Legendre symbol codes and pair-
wise equality codes. All these codes, nonetheless, have
exponentially-small rate, where the (message) rate of
a code is a ratio of message length and codeword’s
block length.
This paper is motivated by the question of whether
there exists a family of efficiently quantum list decod-
able codes of polynomially-small rate and constant
codeword alphabet size, because such a code family
finds useful applications to quantum complexity the-
ory (an example will be seen in Section 5). Natu-
ral candidates are well-studied Reed-Solomon codes.
They have relatively large rate; however, they usu-
ally have large alphabet size. A standard way to
build a code of large rate but small alphabet size is to
concatenate two codes of good properties. We claim
that concatenating generalized Reed-Solomon codes
with Hadamard codes gives the desired codes, assum-
ing that the generalized Reed-Solomon codes are effi-
ciently quantum list decodable. This claim is proven
by employing in Section 3 a technique of constructing
a “quantum reduction” between two quantumly cor-
rupted codewords. Note that this technique requires
no soft information, which is a key ingredient in the
classical case of [7, 8].
Are the generalized Reed-Solomon codes efficiently
quantum list decodable? A direct and simple ap-
proach toward their quantum list decoding is an ap-
plication of the polynomial reconstruction algorithm
of Guruswami and Sudan [7]. When codeword pres-
ence in a quantumly corrupted codeword is relatively
high, we can show in Section 4 how to construct
a quantum list decoding algorithm for the general-
ized Reed-Solomon codes. As the presence becomes
lower, however, it seems harder to solve efficiently
the quantum list decoding problem for the generalized
Reed-Solomon codes, because its efficient list decod-
ing leads to the unexpected consequence that every
NP-problem can be efficiently solved on a quantum
computer with high success probability. There is also
a direct connection between quantum list decodabil-
ity of the generalized Reed-Solomon codes and quan-
tum solvability of two classical problems: the noisy
polynomial interpolation problem (NPIP) [13] and the
bounded distance vector problem (BDVP).
To a certain type of application, our quantum list
decoding algorithm for the aforementioned concate-
nated code is still applicable. Our example is the
QCMA search problem, in which we want to find a
classical witness of polynomial size that forces a given
polynomial-time quantum algorithm to accept with
high probability. We show in Section 5 that solving
this search problem on average implies solving it in
worst case.
Finally, we make a brief discussion on the notion of
local quantum list decoding based on an implicit-input
implicit-output model where an outcome of a list de-
coder is a list of descriptions of quantum circuit list-
decoders. Similar to the classical case of [17], we can
apply our quantum list decoder for the generalized
Reed-Solomon codes to do local quantum list decod-
ing for Reed-Mu¨ller codes from quantumly corrupted
codewords. As an immediate consequence, we can
prove the so-called hardness amplification of quantum
circuits, following the argument of [17].
2 Foundations of Quantum List Decoding
This section explains basic notions and notation con-
cerning quantum list decoding. Throughout this pa-
per, let N denote the set of all nonnegative inte-
gers and set N+ = N − {0}. For any positive in-
tegers m,n with m ≤ n, let [m,n]Z denote the set
{m,m+1,m+2, . . . , n} and let [n] be short for [1, n]Z
if n ≥ 1.
2.1 Classical Block Codes
We briefly explain classical block (error-correcting)
codes, which are objects of our interest. Roughly
speaking, a code is a set of strings of the same length
over a finite alphabet Σ and each string of a code
is indexed by a message and is called a codeword.
In this paper, we are mostly focused on a family of
codes, each of which corresponds to a different mes-
sage length n in N. Such a code family is in general
specified by a series (Σn, In,Γn) of message space Σn,
index set In, and code alphabet Γn for each message
length n (which serves as a “basis parameter” in this
paper).
As standard in complexity theory, a code C is
viewed as a function that, for each message length
n, maps Σn × In to Γn. Let N(n) = |Σn| and q(n) =
|Γn|. It is convenient to assume that Σn = (Σ′n)n
so that n actually represents the length of messages
in Σn over the message alphabet Σ
′
n; in this case,
n = ⌈log|Σ′n|N(n)⌉ for each n ∈ N. By abbreviating
C(x, y) as Cx(y), we treat Cx(·) as a function map-
ping In to Γn and is called a codeword, where the block
length M(n) of such a codeword is |In|. For simplic-
ity, we often assume that In = {0, 1, . . . ,M(n) − 1}
so that each element of In can be expressed in
⌈log2M(n)⌉ bits. We freely identify Cx with the vec-
tor (Cx(0), Cx(1), · · · , Cx(M(n)− 1)) in the ambient
space (Γn)
M(n) of dimension M(n). We mainly work
on a finite field and we often regard Γn as the finite
field Fq(n) (= GF(q(n))) of order q(n).
The (message) rate of C is defined to be the ra-
tio n/M(n). The (Hamming) distance d(Cx, Cy) be-
tween two codewords Cx and Cy is the number of
non-zero components in the vector Cx − Cy . The
minimal distance d(C) of a code C is the small-
est distance between any pair of distinct codewords
in C. In contrast, ∆(Cx, Cy) denotes the relative
(Hamming) distance d(Cx, Cy)/M(n). The above-
described code is simply called a (M(n), n)q(n)-code
∗
(or (M(n), n, d(n))-code if the minimal distance d(n)
of the code of message length n is emphasized). We
may drop a length parameter n from both subscript
and argument place whenever we discuss a set of code-
words with a “fixed” n.
Hadamard Codes HAD. Let n be any message
length, used as a parameter, and let q be any
prime number. A q-ary Hadamard code family
HAD(q) = {HAD(q,n)}n∈N consists of (qn, n, qn −
qn−1)q-codes obtained as follows. For each message
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) in (Fq)
n, let HAD(q,n)x (r) =∑n
i=1 xiri mod q, where r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn) ∈ (Fq)n.
(Normalized) Generalized Reed-Solomon Codes GRS.
Let q be any prime and let k, n be any positive in-
tegers with n ≤ k ≤ q. A (normalized) generalized
Reed-Solomon code family GRS = {GRS(k,n,q)}n,k∈N
consists of all (k, n, k − n + 1)q-codes obtained as
follows. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ (Fq)n be any
message and let Dk be a set of k distinct elements




i−1 mod q be the polynomial of degree at
most n− 1 for each r ∈ Dk.
2.2 Quantumly Corrupted Codewords and
Codeword Presence
We are mostly concerned with a quantum corruption
that occurs during a quantum procedure of encoding
messages into codewords. The process of such a quan-
tum corruption can be described as a certain type of
unitary map. Formally, a quantum-computationally
corrupted codeword (or quantumly corrupted code-
word) is a unitary operator O˜, with two fixed function
parameters l(n) and m(n) mapping N to N, that sat-
isfies the following condition: for any three strings
r ∈ Σn, s ∈ Σl(n), and t ∈ Σm(n), there exists a unit




αr,z|r〉|s ⊕ z〉|t⊕ φr,z〉,
where the notation |t ⊕ φr,z〉 is shorthand for∑
w∈Σm(n)〈w|φr,z〉|t ⊕ w〉 and ⊕ is the bitwise
XOR. The presence of codeword Cx in O˜, denoted
PreO˜(Cx), is the average probability of obtaining the





r |αr,Cx(r)|2. See [12] for an intu-
ition behind these notions.
We further expand the notions of presence and dis-
tance. Let n be any message length. Define Wn to be
the set of all vectors w = (wr,z)r,z ∈ [0, 1]q(n)M(n)
(which is viewed as a “measured” quantumly cor-
rupted codeword) such that
∑
z∈[0,q(n)−1]Z wr,z = 1
for each index r ∈ [0,M(n) − 1]Z. Notice that∑
r
∑
z wr,z = M(n) for any w ∈ Wn. Next, con-
sider the set Vn of all codewords a = (ar)r ∈
([0, q(n)− 1]Z)M(n). We embed this codeword a into
Wn in the following way. Define v(a) = (δ
(a)
r,z )r,z ∈
{0, 1}q(n)M(n), where δ(a)r,z = 1 if a(r) = z and 0 oth-
erwise. Moreover, for any code (i.e., a subset of Vn)
∗In some literature, the notation (M(n),Γn)q(n) is used instead.
C(n), let v(C(n)) = {v(a) | a ∈ C(n)}. Finally, we
obtain v(Vn) ⊆Wn.
First, we expand the notion of presence. For any
a ∈ Vn and any vector w ∈ Wn, define Prew(a) =
1
M(n) 〈v(a)|w〉, where 〈·|·〉 denotes the standard in-
ner product. Second, we expand the notion of the
(Hamming) distance. For any pair v, w ∈ Wn, define
d(v, w) = M(n) − 〈v|w〉. This new definition clearly
expands the standard notion of the distance d(·, ·) be-
cause, for any a, b ∈ Vn, we have
d(v(a), v(b)) =M(n)− 〈v(a)|v(b)〉) = d(a, b).




= 1− d(v(a), w)
M(n)
.
2.3 Presence Versus Minimal Distance
A relatively good upper bound on the value of
presence is shown in [12] by following a geomet-
ric method of Guruswami and Sudan [9], who
gave a q-ary extension of Johnson bound. Let
C be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family with mes-
sage space Σn and define Pq(n)(M(n), d(n), ε(n)) as
supO˜ {|{x ∈ Σn | PreO˜(Cx) ≥ ε(n)}|}, where “sup” is
taken over all quantumly corrupted word O˜ for C.
Lemma 2.1 [12] Let n be any message length.
Let (ε(n), q(n), d(n),M(n)) satisfy the inequal-
ity ε(n) > ℓ(n), where ℓ(n) equals 1/q(n) +
(1− 1/q(n))
√
1− (d(n)/M(n)) (q(n)/(q(n) − 1)).
Assume that C is an (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family.






where ̺(n) = (ε(n) − 1/q(n))2 − (1− 1/q(n))2.
In case where ε(n) = ℓ(n), it holds that
Pq(n)(M(n), d(n), ε(n)) ≤ 2M(n)(q(n)− 1)− 1.
To derive an asymptotic bound from this lemma,
we introduce QLpoly(λ), which indicates the min-
imal possible presence for a family of quantum
list decodable codes of minimal relative distance λ
having only a polynomial-size message list. Let
C = {C(n)}n∈N be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code fam-
ily. For each pair w ∈ Wn and ε ∈ [0, 1],
set E(w, ε) = {a ∈ Vn | Prew(a) ≥ ε}. For
any n ∈ N, let presence(C, l)(n) denote min{ε ∈
R≥0 | ∀w ∈ Wn[ |E(w, ε) ∩ C(n)| ≤ l ]} and de-
fine Pre(C, l) = lim supn{ presence(C,l)(n)M(n) }. More-
over, for any function set F , we define Pre(C,F) =
inf l∈F{Pre(C, l)}. For any function l and any
value λ, let QLl(λ) = infC:∆(C)≥λ{Pre(C, l)}, where
∆(C) = lim infn{∆(C(n))}. For each constant c ∈ N,
let QLpolyc (λ) = supaQLla(λ), where la(n) = an
c.
Finally, QLpoly(λ) is set to be lim supc→∞QL
poly
c (λ).
From Lemma 2.1 follows the next proposition.
Proposition 2.2 Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be any minimal rel-
ative distance. It holds that QLpolyc (λ) ≥ 1/q + (1 −
1/q) (1− λ/(1− 1/q) + λ/anc(1 − 1/q))1/2 and thus,
QLpoly(λ) ≥ 1/q + (1− 1/q) (1− λ(1− 1/q))1/2.
Proof. Consider the case where the upper bound
given in Lemma 2.1 is at most anc. For readability, we
omit the parameter “n” in the following calculation.
We then obtain the inequality
d (1− 1/q)
d (1− 1/q) +M̺ ≤ an
c,































Assuming that ε ≥ 1/q, the proposition follows im-
mediately from the relation λ = d/M . 2
It is still open whether the equality QLpoly(λ) =
1/q + (1− 1/q) (1− λ(1 − 1/q))1/2 holds.
2.4 Implicit-Input Explicit-Output Model
List decoding has been modeled in several different
ways in the past literature. This paper chiefly uses
the model that takes quantumly corrupted codewords
implicitly as an oracle and outputs hidden messages
explicitly. Upon this implicit-input explicit-output
model, the quantum list decoding problem (QLDP)
for a code C is described in the following fashion.
First, let C be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family
with message space Σn and let O be any set of quan-
tumly corrupted codewords for C. Take a bias pa-
rameter ε(n).
ε-Quantum List Decoding Problem (ε-QLDP)
for Code C w.r.t. O
• Input: a message length n and a value 1/ε(n).
• Implicit Input: an oracle O˜ ∈ O representing
a quantumly corrupted codeword for C.
• Output: a list of messages including all mes-
sages x ∈ Σn that satisfy the inequality
PreO˜(Cx) ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n). For convenience, we
refer to such a list as a valid list for the ε-QLDP.
Our goal is to solve this ε-QLDP using quantum
computation with oracle access to a quantumly cor-
rupted codeword in O with success probability at
least δ(n), which is given as a confidence parame-
ter. Now, let us introduce the notion of quantum
list decoding algorithm that works with bias ε and
confidence δ.
Definition 2.3 (quantum list decoding) Let C
be any code family, let ε(n) be any bias parameter,
and let δ(n) be any confidence parameter. A quantum
list decoding algorithm (or a quantum list decoder) for
C with bias ε and confidence δ is a quantum algorithm
A that solves the ε-QLDP for C with success proba-
bility at least δ(n). If A also runs in time polynomial
in (n, 1/ε(n), 1/δ(n)), it is called a polynomial-time
quantum list decoding algorithm for C.
The list size of a quantum list decoding algorithm
refers to the maximal size of a valid list produced by
the algorithm.
Remark: In certain applications, list size plays a cru-
cial role. For instance, if a quantum list decoder pro-
duces a valid list L with probability at least δ(n), it is
possible to specify a hidden message x uniquely with
the same success probability with help of “advice” of
log|Σ| |L| size over message alphabet Σ.
In the rest of this subsection, we discuss a sim-
ple connection between one-way functions and the
QLDPs. To begin with, we introduce the notion of a
one-way function of the strong form, which we prefer-
ably call super one-way.
Definition 2.4 (quantum super one-wayness)
A function f is called quantum super one-way if (i)
there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A
such that A|x〉|0〉 = |x〉|f(x)〉|φx〉 for a certain quan-
tum state |φx〉 and (ii) for any positive polynomial p
and any polynomial-time quantum algorithm B, the
probability that B|f(x)〉|φx〉 outputs x is at most
1/p(n).
Remark: The “standard” one-wayness requires that
B|f(x)〉 outputs x with negligible probability whereby
the information |φx〉 is hidden from the adversary B
who tries to invert f . Our new notion indicates that
B hardly outputs x even though |φx〉 is given besides
f(x) as supplemental information.
A typical example of a quantum super one-way
function is a quantum one-way permutation because,
for a permutation, we can replace |φx〉 in Definition
2.4 with |0m〉 by uncomputing a deterministic proce-
dure that computes f(x) from x.
Lemma 2.5 No polynomial-time quantum list de-
codable code with polynomially-small confidence is
quantum super one-way.
Proof. Let f be a quantum super one-way function
with its length function m(n) ∈ nO(1) (i.e., |f(x)| =
m(|x|)). Consider an (m(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code C and
let Cx(r) denote the rth bit (f(x))r of f(x).
Take a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A
computing C and assume that A|x〉|r〉|0m(n)〉|0m〉 =
|x〉|r〉|Cx(r)〉|φx〉 for a certain quantum state |φx〉.
Fix x arbitrarily and define O˜|r〉|s〉|t〉 = |r〉|s ⊕
Cx(r)〉|t⊕φx〉 for each pair (s, t) of strings. Toward a
contradiction, assume that C has a polynomial-time
quantum list decoder B with polynomially-small con-
fidence. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that ProbB[BO˜(0n) = x] ≥ 1/p(n) for a certain fixed
positive polynomial p. Convert this B to an algo-
rithm that inverts f as follows. On input |f(x)〉|φx〉,
where y ∈ range(f), run B. Whenever B makes an
oracle call with a query |r〉|s〉|t〉, generate its answer
|r〉|s ⊕ (f(x))r〉|t ⊕ φx〉 from the input information.
Finally, output an outcome of B. This implies that f
is not quantum super one-way, a contradiction. 2
3 Codes of Polynomially-Small Rate
A family of polynomial-time classical list decodable
codes of polynomially-small rate and binary codeword
alphabet finds numerous applications in the fields of
cryptography and complexity theory (see, e.g., [16]).
Since all known efficiently quantum list decodable
code families have exponentially-small rate, it is natu-
ral to ask whether there is any quantum list decodable
code of polynomially-small rate and small alphabet
size for any given bias parameter.
3.1 Concatenated Codes
A standard way of building a family of classical block
codes of polynomially-small rate and small codeword
alphabet size is to concatenate two codes of good
properties: for instance, a generalized Reed-Solomon
code and a Hadamard code. We can build a similar
code under the assumption that the generalized Reed-
Solomon codes are efficiently quantum list decodable
for a certain bias value.
We first explain Forney’s [4] notion of concatenated
codes. Let us consider two codes C(1) and C(2) such
that C(1) is an (M1, n1, d1)qn2 -code and C
(2) is an
(M2, n2, d2)q-code. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn1) be any
message of length n1, where each xi is taken from
Σn2 over a q-letter alphabet Σ. Since xi can be ex-
pressed as a n2-letter string, x can be viewed as a
string of total length n1n2 over a q-letter alphabet.
The code C = C2 ⊙ C1, given by the inner code
C(2) concatenated with the outer code C(1), is defined
as C(x, r, s) = C(2)(C(1)(x, r), s). This concatenated
code C is an (M1M2, n1n2, d)q-code, where d satisfies
d ≥ d1d2, where d1d2 is called the design distance.
For our purpose, we choose the concatenated code
CGRS-H [n, q, θ] explained in [8].
Concatenated Code CGRS-H [n, q, θ]. This is the
concatenated code obtained by a certain general-
ized Reed-Solomon code as an outer code with a
Hadamard code as an inner code. Following [8], we
choose three parameters (q, n, θ) with n, q ∈ N and
θ ∈ [0, 1] such that n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, n = mqmθ, and
qmθ ∈ N for a certain number m ∈ N. Here, we
use the (qm, qmθ, (1− θ)qm + 1)qm generalized Reed-
Solomon code GRS(q
m,qmθ,qm) as an outer code and
the (qm,m, (1 − 1/q)qm)q Hadamard code HAD(q,m)
as an inner code. The desired code CGRS-H [n, q, θ] =
{CGRS-H [n, q, θ]x}x is the collection of all concate-
nated codes defined by CGRS-H [n, q, θ]x(r, r
′) =
HAD(q,m)⊙GRS(qm,qmθ,qm). This concatenated code
is a (q2m, n, d)q-code, where d ≥ (1 − 1/q)(1− θ)q2m
(design distance). We have the bound log(1/θ)log q ≤
m ≤ n, which further implies that qm ≤ n log qθ log(1/θ) .
Therefore, as far as θ = O(1/p(n)) and q = O(2p(n))
for a certain polynomial p, qm is upper-bounded by
O(n2p(n)2).
Now, we claim that CGRS-H [n, q, θ] is quantumly
list decodable for an appropriate choice of parameters
(n, q, θ), assuming that the generalized Reed-Solomon
codes are quantumly list decodable for a specific bias
parameter.
Lemma 3.1 Let (q, n, θ,m, ε, ε′, δ) satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions: n,m, q ∈ N+, θ, ε, ε′, δ ∈ [0, 1], q ≥
2, qmθ ∈ N, n = mqmθ, and ε2 ≥ (q−1)3q2 (q−2m + ε′).
If the (qm, qmθ, (1 − θ)qm + 1)qm generalized Reed-
Solomon code has a quantum list decoder with bias
ε′ and confidence δ running in time polynomial in
(n, q, 1/ε′, 1/δ, 1/θ), then CGRS-H [n, q, θ] has a quan-
tum list decoding algorithm with bias ε and confidence
δ running in time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε′, 1/δ, 1/θ).
In this lemma, the value δ of the confidence of the
generalized Reed-Solomon code is transferred to the
concatenated code CGRS-H [n, q, θ]. The proof of the
lemma is given in the subsequent subsection.
3.2 Quantum Reduction Technique
For the proof of Lemma 3.1, we wish to construct
a “quantum reduction” between two quantumly cor-
rupted codewords. It is useful to describe such a re-
duction, say, from O˜ to O˜′, as a quantum algorithm
that, on each input |r〉|s〉|t〉, computes the outcome
O˜′|r〉|s〉|t〉 by making oracle calls to O˜. This can be
seen as a strong form of well-known Turing reduction
between two languages.
As a key lemma, we show a general result concern-
ing the q-ary Hadamard code used as an inner code
for an arbitrary outer code C. Now, let C be any
(qm, n)qm -code, which is treated as a function C(x, r)
mapping from (Fqm)
n × (Fq)m to (Fq)m. The con-
catenated code D = HAD(q) ⊙ C therefore satisfies
that
D(x, r, s) = C(x, r) · s mod q
for r ∈ (Fq)m and s ∈ (Fq)m. Our goal is to con-
struct a quantum reduction between quantumly cor-
rupted codewords O˜C and O˜D associated with C and
D, respectively. For any unitary transform U , we con-
veniently say that a quantum algorithm A realizes U
if, for any basis state |r〉, A on input |r〉 produces the
state U |r〉 exactly.
We have the following key lemma on the code D.
Lemma 3.2 Let C and D be the codes given as
above and let O˜D be any quantumly corrupted code-
word for D. There exist a polynomial-time quantum
algorithm B and a quantumly corrupted codeword O˜C
for C such that






− 1q2m ; and
2. B realizes O˜C with access to O˜D as an oracle.
From the above lemma, Lemma 3.1 follows easily.
We quickly sketch its proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let (q, n, θ,m, ε, ε′, δ) be the
parameters given in the lemma. For simplicity, write
M = qm. Assume that the (M,Mθ, (1 − θ)M + 1)M
generalized Reed-Solomon code has a polynomial-
time quantum list decoder A with bias ε′ and confi-
dence δ. Let O˜ be any quantumly corrupted codeword
for CGRS-H [n, q, θ]. We want to find all messages x
that satisfy the inequality PreO˜(C
GRS-H [n, q, θ]x) ≥
1/q + ε. By Lemma 3.2, we can reduce O˜ to another
quantumly corrupted codeword O˜C for the outer code















where the last inequality follows from the bound ε2 ≥
(q−1)3
q2 (1/M
2 + ε′). By running a quantum list de-
coder for the GRS(M,Mθ,M), we obtain a list that con-
tains all messages x satisfying PreO˜(GRS
(M,Mθ,M)
x ) ≥
1/M + ε′ with the desired probability. 2
The proof of our key lemma (Lemma 3.2) is much
more involved. We note that a simple approach using
the following relation
Cx(r) = Dx(r, s
(1))Dx(r, s
(2)) · · ·Dx(r, s(m)),
where s(i) = 0i−110l−i, does not give the desired pres-
ence value for Cx.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let C be any (qm, n)qm -code
and let D be the concatenated code HAD(q)⊙C. As-
sume that, for any r, s ∈ (Fq)m, O˜D|r, s〉|0〉|0d〉 =
∑
z∈Fq αr,s,z|r, s〉|z〉|φr,s,z〉. The desired quantumly
corrupted codeword O˜C can be realized by the fol-
lowing quantum algorithm using O˜D as an oracle.
Quantum Algorithm B:
(1) Starting with |r〉|0〉|0d+1〉 (a general case
is similar), move the last register to the left-
most location and then generate the state
(1/
√
q − 1)∑k∈[q] |k〉|r〉|0〉|0d〉.




(3) Apply O˜D to the first three registers.







(4) Encode the content of the fourth register









process is known as the phase encoding.
(5) Apply the inverse of O˜D. The resulted state |ψ′k〉




z βk,r,s,z |k〉|r〉|s〉|0〉|0d〉 +
|k〉|∆k,r〉 with certain amplitudes βk,r,s,z and a cer-
tain vector |∆k,r〉 whose last two registers contain no



























ωk·zq |αr,s,z |2|k〉|r〉|s〉|0〉|0d〉+ |k〉|∆k,r〉.
What is the norm of |∆k,r〉? Since
∑
s,z |βk,r,s,z|2 +
‖|∆k,r〉‖2 = 1, the squared norm of |∆k,r〉 satisfies
1− q−m ≤ ‖|∆k,r〉‖2 ≤ 1− q−(2m+1).
(6) If the last two registers contain |0〉|0d〉, multiply
the content s of the third register by k to obtain k · s;
otherwise, do nothing. Note that k ·s is in (Fq)m since
so is s.
(7) Similarly, exactly when |0〉|0d〉 is in the last
two registers, apply the inverse Fourier transform
(F−1q )
m over Fq to the second register. This produces
the state |ψ′′k 〉 =
∑
w∈(Fq)m γk,r,w|k〉|r〉|w〉|0〉|0d〉 +










(8) Prepare two new registers |0〉|0〉 for |∆k,r〉 and
then generate q−m/2
∑
w∈(Fq)m |r〉|w〉 so that we have
the state q−m/2
∑
w∈(Fq)m |k〉|r〉|w〉 ⊗ |∆k,r〉.
















This ends the description of B.
To complete the proof, we need to evaluate the








z |αr,s,z|2 = 1 for each pair (r, s). Recall
that PreO˜D (Dx) = q
−2m∑
r,s∈(Fq)m |αr,s,Dx(r,s)|2. It



























An argument similar to [12] shows that, for a certain





































This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2. 2
Lemma 3.2 gives a fast quantum reduction from
O˜D to O˜C . By contrast, there also exists a quantum
reduction from O˜C to O˜D with the following condi-
tions.
Lemma 3.3 Let O˜C be any quantumly corrupted
codeword for C. There exist a polynomial-time quan-
tum algorithm A and a quantumly corrupted codeword
O˜D for D such that
1. PreO˜D (Dx) = 1/q + (1− 1/q)PreO˜C (Cx); and
2. A realizes O˜D with oracle access to O˜C .
Proof Sketch. Given O˜C , the following quantum
algorithm A realizes the desired O˜D.
Quantum Algorithm A:
(1) Start with the state |r〉|s〉|0l〉|0d〉|0l〉.
(2) Change the register order to obtain the state
|r〉|0l〉|0d〉|s〉|0l〉.




(4) Compute deterministically z · s mod q from
(s, z) to obtain |ψ2〉 =
∑
z αr,z|r〉|z〉|φr,z〉|s〉|z ·
s mod q〉|φ′s,z〉, where |φ′s,z〉 is the garbage produced
while simulating the deterministic computation in a
reversible fashion.
(5) Change the register order so that we obtain |ψ3〉 =∑
z αr,z|r〉|s〉|z · s mod q〉|z〉|φr,z〉|φ′s,z〉.
It is not difficult to evaluate the value PreO˜D (Dx)
using PreO˜C (Cx).
4 Complexity of generalized Reed-Solomon
Codes
We turn our interest to the question of whether the
generalized Reed-Solomon codes are efficiently quan-
tum list decodable against a given bias parameter.
We point out that a classical approach works well
when the bias is relatively large; however, for smaller
bias, there seems little hope in search of an efficient
quantum list decoder. We also show that the gener-
alized Reed-Solomon codes have natural connections
to the noisy polynomial interpolation problem (NPIP)
of Naor and Pinkas [13] and a lattice problem, which
we call the bounded distance vector problem (BDVP).
4.1 A Direct and Simple Approach
A direct and simple approach toward the quantum list
decoding of the (q, n, q − n + 1)q generalized Reed-
Solomon codes is the use of the Guruswami-Sudan
polynomial reconstruction algorithm [7]. This ap-
proach works well after performing measurement on
all oracle answers when bias is relatively large.
Lemma 4.1 Let n, q ∈ N and ε, ε′, δ ∈ (0, 1) sat-
isfy the conditions: 2 ≤ n ≤ q, n − 2 ≤ qε′ ≤
q − 1, and ε′ +
(
1− 1q − ε′
)√
n−1
1+qε′ < ε ≤ 1 − 1q .
There exists a quantum list decoding algorithm for the
(q, n, q−n+1)q generalized Reed-Solomon codes with
bias ε and confidence δ running in time polynomial
in (n, q, 1/δ, 1/(1− δ)).
Proof. Choose numbers n, q ∈ N and ε, ε′, δ ∈
(0, 1) to satisfy the premise of the lemma. Let
O˜ be any quantumly corrupted codeword for the
GRS(q,n,q). Now, we want to find all messages x satis-
fying the inequality PreO˜(GRS
(q,n,q)
x ) ≥ 1/q + ε. Fix
such a message x arbitrarily in the following argu-
ment.
Let Aε′ = {r ∈ Fq | |αr,GRS(q,n,q)x (r)|
2 ≥ 1/q + ε′}.
It easily follows that |Aε′ | ≥ (1−γε,ε′)q, where γε,ε′ =
1−1/q−ε















Initially, set r to be 0. Using O˜ as an oracle, we
iterate the following procedure by incrementing r by
one. First, we make a query on r to the oracle T









(1 + qε′)(1− δ1/q) .
Notice that 1 − δ1/q ≥ (1 − δ)/q > 0 since δ < 1.
After receiving each answer from O˜, we perform a
measurement on the computational basis over Fq and
store a pair (r, y) if y is a result of this measure-
ment. Since there are at most q/(1 + qε′) values y
with |αr,y|2 ≥ 1/q + ε′, the probability Pr of obtain-
ing all such y’s is bounded by









where the last inequality follows from the choice of T .
After the qth iteration, we can store at most q2/(1 +
qε′) points. Let Sε′ be the set of all stored points.
The probability that Sε′ contains all the points (r, y)






Lastly, we should find all univariate polynomials
p of degree at most n − 1 that lie on at least |Aε′ |
points in Sε′ . For this purpose, we run the well-
known Guruswami-Sudan polynomial reconstruction
algorithm. Guruswami and Sudan [7] gave a deter-
ministic algorithm A that solves in time polynomial
in (m, log q) the following polynomial reconstruction
problem: on input of integers m,n′, t and m points
{(xi, yi)}i∈[m] ⊆ Fq × Fq, find all univariate polyno-
mials p of degree at most n′ which lie on at least t
points, provided that t >
√
mn′.
The choice of our parameters implies that







Therefore, the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm correctly
produces a list† that includes all the polynomials p of
degree at most n− 1 that satisfy |αr,p(r)|2 ≥ 1/q+ ε′
for at least (1 − γε,ε′)q indices r. Hence, the list also
includes all messages x for which PreO˜(GRS
(q,n,q)
x ) ≥
1/q + ε. 2
Combining the above lemma with Lemma 3.1, we
obtain the proposition below.
Proposition 4.2 Let (q, n, θ,m, ε, δ) satisfy the
conditions: m,n, q ∈ N+, ε, δ, θ ∈ [0, 1], q ≥ 2, qmθ ∈
N, n = mqmθ, 2θ < 1+ q−m, and ε2 > t2(θ− q−m)+
1






The concatenated code CGRS-H [n, q, θ] has a quantum
list decoder with bias ε and confidence δ running in
time polynomial in (n, q, 1/ε, 1/δ, 1/(1− δ)).
To use the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm in the
proof of Lemma 4.1, we make the bias ε relatively
large. Is there any other way to list decode the
generalized Reed-Solomon codes from a quantumly
corrupted codeword even for relatively small bias?
We can show in the next proposition that an effi-
cient quantum list decoder for the generalized Reed-
Solomon codes with arbitrary bias and high confi-
dence can be used to solve all NP-problems efficiently
on a quantum computer with high success probability.
Proposition 4.3 Let t(n) be any function from N
to N with t(n) ≥ n for all n ∈ N. If there ex-
ists a quantum list decoder for the generalized Reed-
Solomon codes with arbitrary bias and confidence 2/3
running in t(n) time, then every NP-problem can be
solved by a certain quantum algorithm with success
probability at least 2/3 in nO(1)t(n) time.
Proof. We want to give a reduction from a certain
NP-complete problem to the QLDP with a specific
quantumly corrupted codeword. To make our proof
simple, we use the following restricted form of the
interpolation problem discussed in [6].
Constrained Interpolation Problem (CIP)
• Input: three numbers d, e,m ∈ N, a prime q, a
set A = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} of m points in
Fq × Fq, given in binary.
• Condition: dA(x1) = 1 and dA(xi) = 2 for any
i ∈ [2,m]Z, where dA(x) = |{y | (x, y) ∈ A}|.
• Question: is there any univariate polynomial p
of degree at most d such that p(x1) = y1 and
p(xi) = yi for at least e different i’s?
This problem is clearly in NP and is also proven
to be NP-hard‡ [6]. Now, let d, e,m ∈ N, let q be a
†Actually, to obtain an output of a unique list, we need to repeat
the above process.
‡This fact is observed by examining the reduction constructed
in [6] from the subset sum problem.
prime, and let A = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} be any
set of m points in Fq × Fq. Define D as the set
{x1, . . . , xm} of code locators and write ℓ = |D|. Note
that ℓ = (m− 1)/2 by the given condition.
Using A, we define a quantumly corrupted code-
word O˜ of the form O˜|x〉|s〉|t〉 = ∑y∈Fq αx,y|x〉|y ⊕
s〉|t〉 for every x ∈ Fq. Let (x, y) be any point in
Fq × Fq. If (x, y) ∈ A, let αx,y = 1/
√
dA(x); oth-
erwise, let αx,y = 0. Finally, let ε = ε(e,m, q) =
e+2
2ℓ − 1q . Note that ε > 0 since ℓ ≤ q.
Now, we claim the following: a polynomial p of
degree d passes on at least e points in A as well as


















Therefore, solving the CIP can be reduced to solving
the ε-QLDP with O˜. Note that it takes only quantum
polynomial time to realize O˜ from the set A (which
is given as an input). Applying a t(n)-time quantum
list decoder for the ε-QLDP with confidence 2/3, we
obtain a valid list of polynomials p. The list size is
at most t(n). Since the list may contain illegitimate
polynomials, we need to check if each p passes on at
least e + 1 different points in A including (x1, y1).
This quantum algorithm solves the CIP with success
probability at least 2/3. 2
Since the inclusion NP ⊆ BQP seems unlikely,
there is little hope to find a “polynomial-time” quan-
tum list decoder for the generalized Reed-Solomon
code with relatively small bias.
4.2 Noisy Polynomial Interpolation Problem
We point out that quantum list decoding of the gen-
eralized Reed-Solomon code is closely related to the
noisy polynomial interpolation problem§ introduced
by Naor and Pinkas [13].
Noisy Polynomial Interpolation Problem
(NPIP)
• Input: three numbers k,m, n ∈ N, a prime q, n
distinct points {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in Fq, and n sets
S1, . . . , Sn, each of which consists of exactly m
elements from Fq.
• Promise: there exists a unique polynomial p of
degree at most k such that, for each i ∈ [n],
there exists exactly one element y ∈ Si satisfying
p(xi) = y.
• Output: the hidden polynomial p.
Naor and Pinkas used the NPIP as an intractable
assumption for a cryptographic primitive, called
oblivious polynomial evaluation. Now, we prove the
following.
Proposition 4.4 If the generalized Reed-Solomon
codes are quantum list decodable with arbitrary bias
and confidence 2/3, then there exists a quantum al-
gorithm that solves the NPIP with probability at least
2/3.
Proof. Take n distinct elements X = {x1, . . . , xn}
and n sets S1, . . . , Sn of m elements each. Assume
that the promise of the NPIP holds with a unique
polynomial, say, p of degree at most k. We set the
§This name is actually taken from the paper by Bleichenbacher
and Nguyen [2].
bias ε to be nq (1/m− 1/q) and let S =
⋃
i∈[m] Si.
Note that k,m, n ≤ q.
Let us define a quantumly corrupted codeword
O˜ as follows. For any element x in X , say




y∈Si δi,y|xi〉|s ⊕ y〉|t〉, where δi,y = 1 if y ∈ Si
and 0 otherwise. For the other elements x outside of
X , let O˜|x〉|s〉|t〉 = 1√q
∑
y∈Fq |x〉|s ⊕ y〉|t〉. We claim
that the unique polynomial p satisfies the condition











































Hence, we conclude that PreO˜(p) ≥ 1/q + ε.
Now, consider the ε-QLDP for the GRS(n,k,q) with
O˜. By our assumption, there exists a quantum list
decoder A that solves this ε-QLDP with high con-
fidence. To apply this A to find the hidden poly-
nomial p, we need to realize O˜ from the given in-
puts (x1, . . . , xn, S1, . . . , Sn). This is done by gener-
ating the state O˜|xi〉|s〉|t〉 as follows: choose y in Si
randomly and then generate the amplitude δi,y/
√
m.
Therefore, we can solve the NPIP with high success
probability. 2
4.3 Bounded Distance Vector Problem
To construct a quantum list decoder for the general-
ized Reed-Solomon code against relatively small bias,
it suffices to give a quantum algorithm to the follow-
ing lattice problem.
Bounded Distance Vector Problem (BDVP)
• Input: m basis vectors b1, b2, . . . , bm ∈ Zn and
a radius ξ ∈ Q.
• Oracle: given a vector v ∈ Zn, returns the
value ‖v‖2 =∑j∈[n] λ2jv2j , where v = (v1, . . . , vn)
and λ = (λj)j ∈ [0, 1]n is a weight vector.
• Output: a list that contains all vectors v in the
lattice L spanned by {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, satisfying
‖v‖2 ≤ ξ.
Proposition 4.5 If there exists a quantum algo-
rithm that solves the BDVP with probability at least
2/3, then there exist quantum list decoders for the
generalized Reed-Solomon codes with arbitrary bias
and confidence 2/3.
Proof. The following argument is owing to [2]. We
want to construct an efficient quantum reduction to
the BDVP from the QLDP for the (M,n,M − n +
1)q generalized Reed-Solomon code. This proves the
proposition.
Fix a set DM = {x1, x2, . . . , xM} of M distinct
code locators in Fq and consider the product set
DM × Fq = {(xi, zj) | i ∈ [M ], j ∈ [q]}. Let ε
be any bias and assume that a quantumly corrupted
codeword O˜ for the generalized Reed-Solomon code
satisfies O˜|xi〉|s〉|t〉 =
∑
j∈[q] αi,j |xi〉|s⊕ zj〉|t ⊕ φi,j〉.
The (special) Lagrange interpolation polynomials cor-





Fq[x], which is of degree M − 1, for each i ∈ [M ].
Note that every Li(x) satisfies the following property:




k−1 for certain constants cik ∈ Fq.
Let a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ (Fq)n be any mes-
sage and let pa(x) =
∑n
k=1 akx
k−1 be its codeword,
i.e., the polynomial over Fq of degree at most n− 1.
Now, we assume that PreO˜(pa) ≥ 1/q + ε. Note that




































ij )ij ∈ ZqM be our target vector. We define the set
L as the collection of all vectors d = (dij)ij ∈ ZqM
such that











j=1 dijzjcik = 0 mod q
]
.
It is not difficult to show that L forms a lattice. No-
tice that the target vector δ(a) belongs to L. A set
of basis vectors {b1, b2, . . . , bm} for L can be found
easily (see, e.g., [2]).
Next, we define a weight vector λ = (λij)ij ∈
[0, 1]qM as follows: for each point (xi, zj), let λi,j =√
1− |αxi,zj |2. The weighted norm ‖d‖ of a vec-









ij(1− |αxi,zj |2). Therefore,











= M (1− PreO˜(pa)) .
By taking the radius ξ = M(1 − 1/q − ε), it follows
that ‖δ(a)‖2 ≤ ξ iff PreO˜(pa) ≥ 1/q + ε.
To solve the QLDP, we first compute a basis vec-
tors b1, . . . , bm and a radius ξ. We then solve the
BDVP using the weight vector (given by an oracle).
Let v1, . . . , vk be the resulted list of vectors in L. For
each vi, find ai ∈ (Fq)n such that vi = δ(ai) by solving
a set of linear equations. 2
5 Quantum Search Problems
We present an example of how to use Proposition 4.2.
Our example here is a QCMA search problem. Set
our alphabet Σ to be {0, 1} in this section. A QCMA
search problem is a triplet (L,M, p), where L is a lan-
guage, M is a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
taking inputs from Σ∗ × Σ∗, and p is a polynomial,
with the following two requirements:
1. for every x ∈ L, there exists a witness y ∈ Σp(|x|)
such that ProbM [M(x, y) = 1] ≥ 2/3; and
2. for every x 6∈ L, ProbM [M(x, y) = 0] ≥ 2/3 holds
for any string y ∈ Σp(|x|).
A solution function f for the search problem (L,M, p)
satisfies that (i) for every x ∈ L, ProbM [M(x, f(x)) =
1] ≥ 2/3 and |f(x)| = p(|x|) and (ii) for every x 6∈
L, f(x) = ⊥ (a special symbol). Moreover, QCMA
denotes the class consisting of all languages L over
the alphabet Σ such that there exist a polynomial-
time quantum algorithm M and a polynomial p for
which (L,M, p) is a QCMA search problem.
Proposition 5.1 Let s be any positive polynomial.
The following two statements are equivalent.
1. For every QCMA search problem, there exist
its solution function g and a polynomial-time
quantum algorithm A such that, for every x,
ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = (g(x))i] ≥ 1/2 + 1/s(|x|).
2. For every QCMA search problem, there exist
its solution function fand a polynomial-time
quantum algorithm B such that, for every x,
ProbB[B(x) = f(x)] ≥ 2/3.
An immediate corollary is stated as follows.
Corollary 5.2 Assuming that QCMA 6= BQP, for
every positive polynomial pair (p, p′) with p′(n) >
p(n) for all n ∈ N, there exists a QCMA search prob-
lem P that satisfies the following: for any solution
function f for P, no polynomial-time quantum algo-
rithm finds strings y, on each input x of length n,
with probability at least 1− 2p(n)p′(n)(p(n)+2) such that the
relative distance ∆(y, f(x)) is at most 1/2− 1/p(n).
Proof. Assume that QCMA 6= BQP. Assume also
that, for every QCMA search problem, there exist
its solution function f and a polynomial-time quan-
tum algorithm A that finds a string y, on each in-
put x, with probability at least 1− 2p(n)p′(n)(p(n)+2) with
∆(y, f(x)) ≤ 1/2− 1/p(n).
Consider the following algorithm B: on input
(x, 1i), run A on input x and then output the ith
bit of its outcome. The success probability of B is
lower-bounded by
















Now, choose a polynomial s satisfying that
1/s(n) ≤ 1/p(n) − 1/p′(n) for all n ∈ N. By Propo-
sition 5.1, we have a polynomial-time quantum algo-
rithm that computes a certain solution function with
probability at least 3/4. This means that QCMA is
included in BQP, a contradiction. 2
Finally, we give the proof of Proposition 5.1.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let s be any positive
polynomial. Take two positive polynomials q, t and
a (t(n), n)2-code family C that is polynomial-time
classically list decodable and has a polynomial-time
quantum list decoder D with bias 1/s(t−1(n)) and
confidence 2/3, producing a list of size at most q(n),
where n is message length. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that t(n) ≥ n for all n ∈ N.
The implication (2) ⇒ (1) is trivial. Next, we as-
sume (1) and want to show (2). Let P = (L,M, p)
be any QCMA search problem. Assume also that
p(n) ≥ n for all n ∈ N. Note that a standard major-
ity vote technique can reduce the bounded error prob-
ability of a quantum algorithm exponentially small
(without changing the witness size) by polynomially-
many repetitions. Therefore, we can assume from (1)
that
1. for every x ∈ L, there exists a witness y ∈ Σp(|x|)
such that ProbM [M(x, y) = 1] ≥ 1−2−r(|x|); and
2. for every x 6∈ L and for every y ∈ Σp(|x|), we have
ProbM [M(x, y) = 0] ≥ 1− 2−r(|x|),
where r(n) = t(p(n)) + 3 and M is a certain
polynomial-time quantum algorithm that depends on
(p, r, L).
Now, we define another QCMA search problem P ′
as follows. Let Cy denote the codeword, to which y is
encoded, of block length t(|y|). Consider the quantum
algorithm M ′ that behaves as follows.
On input (x, z), first run the classical list de-
coding algorithm in polynomial time to pro-
duce with probability at least 5/6 a list S of
candidates for C using z as a classically cor-
rupted codeword (or a received word). Next,
check if z = Cy for a certain y ∈ S. If there
is no such y, reject immediately. Assuming
z = Cy, run M(x, y) and outputs its out-
come.
Let P ′ = (L,M ′, p). We then claim that P ′ is a
QCMA search problem. Take any n ∈ N and any
x ∈ Σn. Consider the case where x ∈ L. Since there
exists a witness y ∈ Σp(n), the corresponding code-
word z = Cy forces M
′ to accept (x, z) with prob-
ability at least 56 (1 − 2−r(|x|)) ≥ 2/3. For the other
case where x 6∈ L, let z be any string in Σt(p(n)). If
z 6= Cy for all y ∈ S, then M ′ accepts (x, z) with
probability ≤ 1/6. On the contrary, if z = Cy for a
certain y ∈ S, thenM ′ accepts (x, z) with probability
≤ 562−r(|x|) ≤ 1/3.
Again, by the majority vote technique, we can re-
duce the error probability of M ′ to 2−r(n). Abusing
the notation, we useM ′ to denote this new algorithm.
By our assumption (1), there exist a solution function
g for P ′ and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A
such that, for every x ∈ Σn,
A(x, 1i) = αx,i,0|i〉|0〉|φx,0〉+ αx,i,1|i〉|1〉|φx,1〉,
where ‖|φx,b〉‖ = 1 for any choice b ∈ {0, 1}, and
ProbA,i[A(x, 1i) = (g(x))i] ≥ 1/2 + 1/s(n).
We fix an arbitrary x and, for the meantime, we
omit subscript x. Let us define the oracle O˜ as follows:
O˜|i〉|0〉|0〉 = αi,0|i〉|0〉|φi,0〉+ αi,1|i〉|1〉|φi,1〉.
If there exists a string y satisfying Cy = g(x), then



















Recall that D produces a list of size at most t(n)
for message length n. We assume the standard order
in Σp(n). Consider the following algorithm B.
On input x (n = |x|), run D using O˜ as an
oracle to produce a list S′ of t(p(n)) candi-
dates (since the message size is p(n)), which
include the above y (if x ∈ L), with prob-
ability ≥ 1 − 2−r(n). Run M ′(x, z) sequen-
tially for all z ∈ S′ in order. Output the
first z ∈ S′ such that M ′(x, z) outputs 1. If
there is no such z, output ⊥.
Let f(x) be the minimal string z in S′ such that (i)
ProbM ′ [M
′(x, z) = 1] ≥ 1 − 2−r(n)
z′ < z in S′, ProbM ′ [M ′(x, z′) = 0] ≥ 1 − 2−r(n).
The probability that B(x) outputs f(x) is at least(
1− 2−r(n))t(p(n)) ≥ 1 − 2−r(n)+t(p(n))−1 ≥ 3/4. This
guarantees that we obtain f(x) with probability at
least 3/4. 2
6 Further Discussion
In the previous sections, we have used the model of
implicit inputs and explicit outputs. When the run-
ning time of a quantum list decoder is limited to sub-
linear, it becomes impossible to explicitly output a list
of messages. Instead, we may allow a quantum list de-
coder to produces a list of “oracle quantum circuits,”
each of which output each block element of a specific
message with oracle access to a quantumly corrupted
codeword. Such a model is called an implicit-output
model. We briefly discuss a realm of quantum list de-
coding on this implicit-input implicit-output model.
Let us introduce the notion of local quantum list
decoding, analogous to local list decoding.
Definition 6.1 Let C be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-
code family with message alphabet Σ. We say that C
is locally quantum list decodable with bias ε and con-
fidence δ if there exists a quantum algorithm A such
that, for any message length n ∈ N (given in binary,
not in unary), any O˜ for C, and any x ∈ Σn with
PreO˜(Cx) ≥ 1/q + ε(n), the following happens with
probability at least 3/4:
1. A(n) outputs a list of descriptions of oracle quan-
tum circuits D1, D2, . . . , Dℓ; and
2. there exists an index j ∈ [ℓ] such that, for every
i ∈ [n], DO˜j (i) outputs xi with probability at
least δ(n)
Similar to CGRS-H , we can define the concate-
nated code CRM-H using an appropriate Reed-Mu¨ller
code and a proper Hadamard code. Following an ar-
gument of [17], we can easily prove that, using Lem-
mas 3.2 and 4.1, the code CRM-H is efficiently locally
quantum list decodable with polynomially-small bias
and confidence 2/3. Hence, we can conclude:
Lemma 6.2 There exists a code family of
polynomially-small rate and constant codeword
alphabet size that are efficiently locally quantum list
decodable with confidence 2/3 for polynomially-small
bias.
An immediate consequence of this lemma is the
hardness amplification of quantum circuits, again fol-
lowing an argument of [17].
Corollary 6.3 There exists a constant d > 0 for
which the following is true. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) and let
f be any Boolean function from {0, 1}k(n). If no
quantum circuit of size s computes f with probabil-
ity at least δ, then there exists a Boolean function g
mapping {0, 1}ℓ◦k(n) with ℓ(n) ∈ O(n) such that no
quantum circuit C of size s′ = (k(n)/ε)d · s satisfies
ProbC,x[C(x) = g(x)] ≥ 1/2 + ε, where C(x) denotes
the random variable indicating the observed outcome
bit of C on input x.
7 Concluding Remarks and Open Problems
The theme of this paper is an exploration of quantum
list decodable code families of polynomially-small rate
and constant codeword alphabet size. We have shown
that certain generalized Reed-Solomon codes concate-
nated with Hadamard codes achieving such require-
ment are efficiently quantum list decodable when the
bias of presence is relatively large. Even with such
large bias, this helps us show the local quantum list
decodability of Reed-Mu¨ller codes. Notice that a core
part of the proofs of these results heavily relies on
classical list decoding algorithms of [7, 17]. Among
codes of polynomially-small rate, is there any code
whose quantum list decoding algorithm is in essence
different from its classical one? Is there any quantum
list decodable code that is not even classically list de-
codable? Does a generalized Reed-Solomon code have
a subexponential-time quantum list decoder against
arbitrary bias? Another important open problem is
to find useful applications of quantum list decoding
to a wide range of quantum information processing.
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